










By articulating the pragmatics of justification in cases of conflicts among basic rights, 
this paper endeavors to solve the tension between the seeming political vacuity of 
abstract moral universalism and the seeming parochialism of theories sensitive to 
cultural context. This solution emerges within a discourse-theoretic model of political 
judgment - what I name “critical deliberative judgment”. Its parameters are elaborated  
first in a reconstitution of Critical Theory (as a tradition of social philosophy) that 
focuses attention on the emancipatory, rather than the conciliatory dimensions of 
judgment. The model is further elaborated by way of replacing the reliance on ideal 
theory of justice with a pragmatist political epistemology. The latter accounts for the 
way specific experiences of injustice affect publics' identification of what counts as 
relevant issues in debates over conflicting rights. Finally, the model is completed with 
an account of the critical and emancipatory work that democratic practices of open 
dialogue are able to perform, ultimately relating local sensitivities to universal 
demands of justice by disclosing the structural (rather that agent-specific or culture-
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“The executioner always wears a mask: the mask of justice” 
Stanisław Jerzy Lec 
 
Introduction 
Political judgment and human rights draw their force from apparently opposite 
sources: human rights – from the appeal to universal justice; political judgment – 
from the urgency with which immediate and local experiences of injustice trigger 
demands for adjudication and political action.  The tension between context-specific 
considerations and demands for normative rigor is intrinsic to political judgment – the 
judgment over the fair terms of social cooperation, over the right normative order of 
society.  
In what follows, I will advance a solution to this tension in the form of a 
discourse-theoretic concept of political judgment, or what I call a “critical deliberative 
judgment”.  This model develops not by spelling out procedural and substantive 
principles of justice, but by exploring the pragmatics of justification, and highlighting 
the interplay between interest-related and morality-related considerations lying 
therein. My point of departure is the tension that emerges, in cases of conflicts among 
rights, between societal conceptions of justice and conceptions of fairness: a tension 
that calls for the exercise of political judgment. The parameters of the model of 
political judgment I advance first evolve from a particular reconstruction of the 
normative concerns of Critical Theory (as a tradition of social philosophy) that 
enables focusing attention on the emancipatory, rather than on the conciliatory 




conceptualizing the way specific experiences of injustice affect a public's 
identification of what counts as relevant issues in debates over conflicting rights – 
thus shaping societal notions of fairness. Finally, I will address the critical and 
emancipatory work that democratic practices of open dialogue are able to perform, 
ultimately relating local sensitivities to universal demands of justice by disclosing the 
structural (rather that agent-specific or culture-specific) sources of injustice.  
 
1. Justice versus Fairness 
Whenever power feels compelled to speak the language of rights, it is most 
often to endow a course of policy action with the secure foundation that only 
universal validity can grant.  Thus, when in September 2010 the United Nation’s 
Human Rights Council established the legal responsibility of governments to provide 
water and sanitation to their citizens, it vested this responsibility as a new ‘human 
right to clean water and sanitation’  - a right deemed integral to the right to life and 
human dignity.1 Earlier that year the Finish government bound itself to ensure internet 
access to all its citizens, codified as a legal right, itself justified in terms of a 
‘fundamental right to communicate’.2  Finally, at the start of the same year, the United 


























































  UN Resolution “Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation”  
A/HRC/15/L.14; 30 Sept 2010. 	
  
2 According to a poll conducted by GlobeScan for the BBC World Service, almost 
four out of five people around the world believe that access to the Internet is a fundamental 





corporate funding of political broadcasts, on the grounds of corporations’ right to free 
speech.3 
That political causes, even when openly interest-driven, are fought on the 
territory of rights is unsurprising, and even uncontroversial. It is in the essence of 
right that it overrides considerations of pros and cons: there can be no discussion of 
the benefits of the exercise of a ‘right to life’, or the costs of its provision. That is why 
rights, as Ronald Dworkin has famously observed, have the capacity to trump 
interests: that which is general overpowers what is partial and parochial. This power 
of rights derives from the range of their scope of validity: the wider the scope, the 
higher the claim to validity, the stronger the appeal to political responsibility and the 
more irresistible the call for political action. Basic rights issue a universal claim to 
validity, and therefore have the strongest political pull. Unsurprisingly, governments 
in liberal democracies, as much as in autocracies, have in recent years violated the 
basic rights to freedom of speech and privacy in the name of security and safety (for 
instance, by increasing wholesale surveillance measures), by invoking that most 
general of rights – the right to life and the state’s corresponding obligation to 
safeguard it.  It is in this sense that politics’ taste for rights is uncontroversial, and not 
necessarily confined to western liberal democracies.  But the power of rights over 
interests is also unsurprising: philosophical argument has been corroborated by socio-
psychological research revealing that even quite young children are able to distinguish 






































































































an element of the human condition, the sense of justice is also a parameter in the 
mundane operation of power.  
Dealing with rights becomes controversial not when rights come into conflict 
with interests, but when the enforcement of rights that are otherwise recognized as 
valid and are codified as legally binding, clashes with society’s notion of fairness – 
most often in instances of conflict among rights. Thus, it is society’s common sense 
notion of fairness that Justice Stevens invoked in his dissenting opinion in the 
Supreme Court’s judgment of corporate electoral funding:  
In a democratic society, the longstanding consensus on the need to 
limit corporate campaign spending should outweigh the wooden 
application of judge-made rules… At bottom, the Court's opinion is 
thus a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who 
have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining 
self-government since the founding, and who have fought against 
the distinctive corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since 
the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is a strange time to repudiate that 
common sense. While American democracy is imperfect, few 
outside the majority of this Court would have thought its flaws 
included a dearth of corporate money in politics.5 
 
In the case at hand, the sense of unfairness which Judge Stevens’ opinion 
evokes is triggered by a clash among basic rights constitutive of American society’s 
overarching conception of justice: a clash between the right to free speech, and the 
right to self-government. The conflict among rights within a general conception of 
justice is a phenomenon often articulated in the categories of unfairness – a 
phenomenon born out in the tension between ‘having the right to’ and ‘being right 
about’, between ‘having rights’ and ‘being right’. This tension has become tangible in 
the public debate on the building of an Islamic community center and mosque near 









































































it on the grounds of religious freedom, which is guaranteed as a basic right in the U.S. 
Constitution, not only its opponents but also many of its supporters deem that the 
project is “inappropriate”, “insensitive”, or “not right”. 6  Thus, the controversy 
around Park 51 is not generated by the public’s being divided along the fault lines of  
support and rejection of religious freedom; it is generated by the tension between the 
rights we embrace as binding and the notion of fairness that guides our judgment in 
the application of these rights.   
 
A rally about the planned Islamic community center and mosque (“Park 51”) near Ground Zero in New 


























































6 According to an opinion poll conducted among New Yorkers and published in 
the New York Time on September 2nd 2010 , the majority of those surveyed believe that, 
based on freedom of religion, the developers have the right to build Park 51. However, 
some 50 per cent of respondents oppose the project on grounds that it is inappropriate in 
view of prevailing sensitivities after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks when two aircraft 
hijacked by Muslim extremists on September 11, 2001, crashed into the World Trade 
Center's twin towers, causing them to collapse. 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/nyregion/03poll.html)  
7 Ed Payne, “Faith groups divided over New York Islamic Center”, CNN, November 






A similar contrast between a conception of fairness and a rights-based 
conception of justice has recently emerged at the trans-national level via the debate 
over corporate remuneration and taxation. Global corporations that are finding legal 
routes to reducing their tax payments (ultimately grounded on the basic right to 
property) have been accused of incurring losses of human lives. Thus, the 
international development charity Christian Aid has blamed the deaths of 1000 
children a day in developing countries on “transnational corporations’ wielding their 
enormous power to avoid the attention of the taxman.”8 This tension between the right 
to life, on the one hand and, on the other, the right to private property and the rule of 
law, which together constitute the grounds on which corporation’s tax avoidance is 
justified, actuates an emerging global sense of fairness surpassing codified norms of 
justice.  
While society’s shared conception of justice is composed by the unity of basic 
values (including those codified as rights) which it holds to be valid in themselves, the 
conflict among rights that often emerges in the course of rights’ application brings 
about a tension between society’s conception of justice and its conception of fairness.9 
Thus, it was the tension between the right to life and the right to privacy (and free 



































































9 In line with Rawls, I consider here justice only as a virtue of social institutions, not 
of persons or actions; I also endorse his argument about the need to distinguish between the 
concept of justice and that of fairness. However, unlike Rawls, who develops his own concept 
of justice around the notion of fairness in his theory ‘justice as fairness’ in which justice 
becomes synonymous with a fair system of cooperation (thus collapsing the initial distinction 
between justice and fairness), I believe that it is analytically important to maintain the 
difference between the two concepts. For the earliest formulation see John Rawls,  “Justice as 
Fairness”, The Journal of Philosophy 54/22 (1957): 653-662. Throughout later reformulations 
of his position, Rawls does not revise the relationship he articulates here between the notion 




conception of fairness in the abortion debate of the 1970s; it was the tension between 
the abstract principle of equality, as codified in the ‘separate-but-equal’ doctrine, and 
that of individual dignity that, by mobilizing society’s conception of fairness, gave 
valiance to the Supreme Court’s move to outlaw segregation in 1954. By unsettling 
society’s conception of fairness, the tension among codified rights puts into question 
society’s normative order.  This in turn issues a call for political action for resolving 
the conflict of rights, and thus stabilizing society’s normative order.  The process of 
judgment necessary for resolving the conflict of rights in line with society’s 
conception of fairness is properly political judgment.10 How should political judgment 
be guided in reconciling context-dependent notions of fairness with the rules of 
universal justice, spelled out in codified norms of basic rights?  
  
2. Justice, Judgment, Justification  
A strict and stringent enforcement of codified norms of human rights would not go far 
neither in arbitrating among conflicting rights, nor in securing compliance, even 
though it might nominally create a legal obligation. What a narrowly legalistic and 
highly formal notion of human rights excludes is the congruence between law and 
underlying social practice that underpins legitimacy and ensures the practical 
enforceability of law. By failing to take into consideration the situatedness of rights -- 
the way rights are invoked in dealing with particular grievances related to specific 
social practices, or the way participating in law’s construction and interpretation 
within inherited traditions contributes to legitimacy and obligation, such an approach 

























































































soft and customary law as basis for solving conflicts among codified rights is hardly a 
viable alternative. Proponents of this perspective have argued that it is customary law, 
rather than human rights as a codified peremptory norm (jus cogens) that has allowed 
for the operation of human rights law internationally, despite the lack of a mechanism 
of compulsory jurisdiction.11 Indeed, the International Court of Justice has followed 
this approach to promoting greater bindingness by offering less precision. Admittedly, 
the power of imprecise legal norms might go a long way in enabling context-pertinent 
interpretation of rigid norms.  However, this comes at the price of a dangerously 
broad margin of political discretion when deciding on the correct right interpretation 
of rights in light of customary law.12 The difficulty in finding an alterative comes 
from the diametrically opposed natures of human rights and politics: the a-political 
nature of human rights (whose source is human nature, rather than political authority) 
and the deeply political nature of the situations in which rights are invoked as 
guidelines for decision and action. This results in the tension between the necessarily 
abstract moral universalism of human rights and the urgency of immediate and local 
grievances that trigger demands for political judgment.  
The tension between a universal appeal to justice and contextual notions of 
fairness has been recently resolved via a shift of attention from ideal models of justice 
to the process of justification itself, or what Alessandro Ferrara has described as an 
emergent ‘judgment paradigm’ in contemporary political philosophy. This consists in 

















































































































































power of principles, laws, norms and rules to transcend the particularity of contexts, 
and its replacement by a vision of normative validity based on ‘reflective judgment’. 
13 Pioneered by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Bruce Ackerman, Frank Michelman, 
Seyla Benhabib and Ronald Dworkin, this shift of inquiry from principles of justice to 
modes of judgment and justification has most recently been adopted by Amartya 
Sen14, and has culminated in the formulation of what Rainer Forst has defended as the 
‘right to justification’ (also in this collection) - a right that underpins and enables the 
search for justice.  As developed within the communicative turn in Critical Theory 
initiated by Habermas, the judgment paradigm takes the shape of a process of mutual 
reason-giving among participants which proceeds as the “unforced force of the better 
argument”. The shift of focus from pre-established normative guides to the very 
process of democratic opinion and will formation via collective reasoning is 
particularly distinct in Sheyla Benhabib’s conceptualization of democratic iterations -- 
everyday ‘conversations of justification’ through which citizens become gradually 
convinced of the validity of universal moral norms.15 
While entrusting democratic deliberations with the authority and capacity to 
generate rules of social cooperation, models of democratic deliberations advanced 
within the communicative turn in Critical Theory also minimize the danger of 
political arbitrariness by advancing compelling standards of normative validity. 


























































 13 Alessandro Ferrara, “Introduction”, in  Justice and Judgment (London: Sage, 1999), 
p.x. See also A. Ferrara, “Judgment as a Paradigm” The Force of the Example (New 































  Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: 














counterfactual way: we judge whether actual outcomes fit the hypothetical outcomes 
of argumentation under conditions described as ‘an ideal speech situation’ – a 
situation in which reason-giving among participants is free of the power asymmetries 
that permeate actual social interactions.16 Alternatively, Alessandro Ferrara has 
proposed to test the validity of normative claims by means of a reflective judgment 
about the self-congruity or authenticity of an individual or collective identity (also in 
this collection).17 However, to the extent that models of justification rely on idealizing 
presuppositions (e.g., the ideal speech situation; authenticity of identity), it imposes 
its own limitations:  it does not tell us how the actual process of reason-giving 
operates. We are still to provide an account of the mechanism through which 
deliberative political judgment serves the goals of universal justice in actual processes 
of argumentation and justification.  To that end, I advance a process-centered account 
of political judgment, to complement the models of discursive validity already 
advanced within Critical Theory.  
I therefore turn next to the pragmatics of justification (the actual process of 
meaning-formation in the course of reason-giving), which I prefer to approach within 
the analytical perspective of a political sociology of justification, rather than rely on a 
moral anthropology that stipulates an innate moral capacity of individuals. My turning 




















































































































































































natural goodness of human will”18, or what Habermas has defended as the citizens’ 
capacity jointly to adopt a moral point of view independent of, and prior to, the 
various perspectives they individually adopt19 is not due to my own skepticism about 
the natural goodness of the human will or the capacity of publics to access the moral 
point of view.  My misgivings concern the reliability of such optimistic assumptions 
when it comes to analyzing contestations of society’s normative order and the justice 
of political rules.  Instead of a moral anthropology that derives the moral point of 
view from intrinsically cooperative attitudes, it is safer to ground analysis on more 
realistic assumptions about human motivation in social interactions. To the extent that 
all public debates on justice imply a contestation of existing rules of social 
cooperation, all justificatory discourses are deeply political and thus ‘tainted’ by 
instrumental considerations pertaining to partial individual or collective perspectives. 
The real challenge of critical social theory is to account for the possibility of 
emancipation and justice not despite, but through, power-imbued processes of 
contestation. 
Therefore, my first methodological move will be to shed idealizing 
assumptions of two orders: those related to an instrumental, interest-driven and 
conflict-ridden nature of the political, and those related to communicative action free 
of strategic interests and oriented towards understanding (positions that serve as each 










































































































  Jürgen Habermas, “ 'Reasonable' versus 'true,' or the morality of worldviews”, The 
Inclusion of the Other, ed. C. Cronin and P. DeGreiff. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998; p. 
77. Citizens are assumed capable of mutual attribution of a capacity for moral judgment , 
itself drawn from a conviction that social integration of everyday life depends largely on 




in the spirit of what Pierre Bourdieu has described as one in which a focus on the 
‘economy of practices’ supersedes the two equally partial views of economism and 
semiologism, i.e. of reducing social exchanges to rational and strategically oriented 
action, on the one hand, and to phenomena of communication, on the other. 20 From 
such a position, the contestation of the normative order of society is to be seen as 
simultaneously enabled and constrained by existing relations of power.  On this view, 
social interactions are processes of cooperation-within-conflict, processes whose lex 
insita, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world, is that of 
the struggle over the norms regulating the distribution of life chances in any society – 
a struggle as much to perpetuate the normative framework of interactions as to change 
it.  Any practice contains as much the reified rules that constitute it as a recognizable 
social practice and, to the extent that coordinated social life depends on continuous 
interactions for its reproduction, the possibility of challenging the rules and altering 
them in the very process of rule-application. If the dynamics of social interactions are 
simultaneously dynamics of cooperation and of conflict, of perpetuation and change, 
social relations are best described neither as intrinsically cooperative nor as 
intrinsically conflictual in nature, but as cooperation-within-conflict; conflictual 
cooperation that is the source of both the preservation of the social order and of its 
transformation. 
 Viewed from this perspective, the engagement in mutual argumentation does 
not need to hinge on an intersubjectively shared moral point of view. What Rainer 
Forst has conceptualized as the ‘right to justification’ could also be derived within the 

























































20 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital", In John Richardson, Ed. Handbook of 





reflex of justification is intrinsic to social interactions conceived as a process of 
conflict-within-cooperation. As social interactions are constitutive of actors’ social 
identities, actors have a simultaneous interest in maintaining, as well as questioning 
and altering these relations. Thus, whether an actor wants to preserve a certain modus 
of a social relations or alter it, she, being a side to a relation that constitutes her as a 
social actor, can neither alter, nor preserve it, without justification to all those who are 
her counterparts within the given social relation.  In the political realm this takes the 
form of the necessity of modern power to justify itself in order to perpetuate itself.  If, 
as Hannah Arendt has contended, power corresponds not just to the human ability to 
act, but to act in concert, and the legitimacy of power (in democratic as well as 
autocratic regimes), is always ultimately anchored in ‘the opinion upon which many 
are publicly in agreement’21, that is, in commonly held convictions – then the 
justification of political action is a socio-political impulse, endogenous to the very 
structure of power relations as relations enabling acting in concert (i.e., governance). 
That is why symbolic practices of justification (not only communicative ones), are 
used even by autocratic political regimes, especially in modern societies that cannot 
rely on social integration via a settled traditional ethos.  
 This understanding of justification as a socio-political impulse typical of 
modern societies has implications about the status of normative conflicts.  Disputes 
about the justice of the normative order of society originate from clashes of views on 
the fair distribution of life chances within a given normative order, thus triggering 
political dynamics of conflict. These clashes, however, are unthinkable where social 
practices do not create a shared world of social cooperation: as John Dewey often 







































































practices.22 Appeals to justice always take place as others-oriented grievances about 
the unfairness of the particular societal pattern in the distribution of life-chances. In 
such a process, instrumental (interest-based) and ideational (moral) dimensions of 
judgment are not only inextricably linked, but also equally relevant. It is the very 
imbrication, rather than separation between, on the one hand, interests endogenous to 
actors’ identities and, on the other, identity-transcending moral considerations, that 
activate the dynamics of justification.  
 This synergy between identity-constituting interests and context-transcending 
moral orientations in the symbolic practices of justification is notable in the history of 
rights. I will next undertake a conceptual archeology into the historical emergence of 
the ’due process’ norm, in order to present it as a prototype of the right to 
justification. This will supply an additional argument in support of the right to 
justification: an argument emerging not within moral philosophy, but instead within 
the perspective of what I described above as the socio-political impulse to 
justification underlying the operation of modern social practices and modern power 
dynamics.  
 The prototype of modern rights as we know them are those codified in the 
English Magna Carta of 1215. The familiar ‘moralist’ rendition of the story tells us 
that a combination of higher taxes, unsuccessful wars and conflict with the Pope had 
made King John unpopular with his barons, who raised grievances against the central 
power and demanded limitations to that power in the form of codified freedoms.23 A 


































































































barons really sought was to overthrow the King, the demand for a charter being a 
"mere subterfuge".24 Both readings give a story of contestation of the existing 
normative order in which parochial interests were mixed with cogent, for the given 
context, perceptions of the social circumstances for the safeguard of dignity – the 
increase of taxes (an attack on wellbeing), combined with central power’s failing to 
safeguard sovereignty, triggered perceptions of unfairness and subsequent demands 
for altering the organization of power. The notions of unfairness in the case at hand 
are neither solely constituted by the encroachment on the material interests of the 
nobility; nor by the king’s failure to perform the key legitimacy-conferring functions 
of central power: the protection of its subjects’ welbeing. It is the combination 
between interest-based motive, linked to the social position of the rebelling barons as 
members of the nobility, and interest-transcending notions related to the key 
legitimate and legitimacy-conferring functions of central power (to use Claus Offe’s 
terms)25 that prompted the contestation of the existing normative order in 13th century 
England.  
The most significant outcome of this contestation was that, in contrast to 
previous cases when the rebellious nobility had rallied around an alternative monarch, 
it is the first time that it sought protection of their liberties in the law, namely in the 
principle of ‘due process’.  Although in current-day usage ‘due process’ refers to the 
notion that laws and legal proceedings must be fair, or the principle that the 



















































































































the law26, tracing back the line of formulations of ‘due process’ would lead us to the 
right to justification. Let us note that the term “due process of law” was only 
formulated in the revision of Magna Carta in 1369.  Significantly, this formulation, 
which put the stress on rights codified in law, has replaced the earlier formulation of  
“lawful judgment of his peers”: 
"No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his 
standing in any other way, nor will be proceed with force 
against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful 
judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.”27  
 
This original focus on judgment and shared norms of fairness, which has subsequently 
been lost, is significant. The contestation of the authoritative normative order that led 
to the earliest codified protection against arbitrary power invoked, before all else, a 
notion of justification: that whenever the central authority acted to harm a person, this 
had to be done upon examination of the valid grounds for such an action.  The later, 
more legalistic formulation of due process that places the stress on codified legal 
rules, has obliterated the original notion of justification as articulation, in the course 
of judgment, of the valid grounds on which central authority can act against the 
individual. This notion of justification, formulated in 1215, is the starting point from 
which an on-going process of generalization began in which freedoms gained as 
privilege transformed into universal rights.  The engine of this generalization was the 
right to justification formulated in clause 29 of the 1215 statute. It is due to the notion 
of justification, as it invites questioning of the normative grounds of political action 




























































































in the sense of non-serf, were extended to all: the 1354 statute replaced the 
formulation ‘no free man’ with ‘no man, of whatever estate or condition he may be’.28  
 
3. The Problem of Validity  
If we conceive of the right to justification as being grounded in the very socio-
political dynamics of the operation of modern power, this alleviates the reliance on 
unsafe (as compelling as they might otherwise be) idealizing presuppositions about 
the moral attributes of individuals or about the quality of communication. However, 
this relative gain in conceptualizing the right to justification comes at the expense of 
clarity about criteria of validity: when should a judgment about the justice of social 
norms and political rules be considered valid? Normative political philosophy has 
advanced criteria of validity in the form of constraining assumptions either about the 
settings of judgment  -- as in the  ‘ideal speech situation’ of Habermas, or in Rawls’s 
‘veil of ignorance’, or alternatively by introducing more substantive tests, as that of 
the self-congruity of an identity (Ferrara). As Habermas notes, “there seems to be no 
way around the explanation of the moral point of view in terms of a procedure that 
claims to be context-independent. 29Yet, it seems to me that such an alternative, that 
is, the possibility of deriving the moral point of view from context-dependent claims, 
is effectively available within the very philosophical tradition within which Habermas 
writes – Critical Theory of Frankfurt School descent.  
Within the perspective of analysis articulated by the founders of Critical 
Theory, normative standards informing critique are to be derived not from posited 

















































































injustice operating in a given context. Three related elements are constitutive of this 
particular notion of critique, which I espouse in advancing my own theory of critical 
political judgment.30 First, this is critique from an “internal point of view”, or what 
Theodor Adorno has described as immanent, as opposed to transcendental critique.31 
Second, at its center is a stratum of empirical experiences of suffering.  In this sense, 
to borrow Michael Walzer’s apt phrase, social criticism is “the educated cousin of 
common complaint”.32 From this perspective the question “What is Justice” cedes 
priority to that of “Who suffers?”.  Here Critical Theory comes close to the position 
held by philosophical pragmatism, formulated with regard to rights by Richard Rorty 
in the following way: 
 
The difference between an appeal to end suffering and an 
appeal to rights is the difference between an appeal to 
fraternity, to fellow-feeling, to sympathetic concern, and an 
appeal to something that exists quite independently from 
anybody’s feeling about anything – something that issues 
unconditional commands. 33 
 
The third feature of critique concerns the type of experiences of 
suffering that qualify as object of social criticism.  These are experiences 
of social injustice —i.e., experiences originating in the socio-structural 
dynamics of the distribution of life-chances in society.  As Nancy Fraser 





































































































  Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 




















not so much in terms of individual and pre-political (psychological) 
experiences of suffering, but ones related to social subordination.34 This 
re-directs attention to the political economy of capitalism, an interest the 
Frankfurt School writers inherited from Marx.  Without upholding the 
importance of political economy in the production of social patterns of 
injustice, Critical Theory would lose its critical edge.  
Combined, the three elements of critique designate the larger conceptual 
territory of Critical Theory. While the purpose of critique is to bring to light the 
socio-structural origin of experiences of injustice, normative criterion of validity (of 
claims, policy actions, and political rules) is the alleviation of such suffering; in turn, 
the goal of political action is changing the pattern of social relations within which 
structurally generated suffering takes place (in this sense neither distribution nor 
recognition would suffice). The normative goal of critique, therefore, is not the 
articulation or production of a societal consensus over principles of justice codified as 
rights, but the unveiling and elimination of socio-historical patterns of injustice. The 
proper purpose of critique, and of political action guided by it, is emancipation, not 
justice.  
 


























































34 Nancy Fraser, “On the Place of Experience in Critical Theory: Against the 
Reduction of Political Sociology to Moral Psychology” in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, 
Redistribution or Recognition: A Political-Philosophical Exchange (Verso, 2003), pp.201-
210; at p. 205. Here Fraser rejects Axel Honneth’s diagnosis that social and political conflicts 
have their source in the "moral" injuries that arise from assaults on the basic human need for 
recognition in unequal societies. She prefers to see misrecognition not as a psychological 
injury but as "status subordination" generated via institutionalized patterns of discrimination 




How does the operation of judgment within the process of justification of normative 
claims attain emancipation in the particular sense described above?  Let us examine 
the practical process of judgment and justification, putting aside the constraints of 
idealizing assumptions – both those regarding the process of reason-giving, as well as 
those regarding the moral and cognitive capacities of individuals.   As I already noted, 
claims to justice most often originate as specific grievances of suffering, and proceed 
as a contestation of the normative order of society (provided that the sources of 
suffering are social in nature). According to the form of critique adumbrated above, 
however, there is no position of normative validity that is untainted by the dynamics 
of power and free of the normative vocabularies of these dynamics.  This means that 
the structural features of the sources of social injustice are encoded in the very 
operation of judgment – they are endemic to the pragmatics of justification.  How can 
then political judgment nevertheless play an emancipatory role?  
I have outlined elsewhere the parameters of such a model of judgment, which 
I have described as a ‘critical deliberative judgment’.35 This is a process of reason-
giving that proceeds not so much along the logic of the force of the better argument 
(testing of arguments against the counterfactual situation of power-free conditions of 
justification), but instead as a process in which participants, by giving account of the 
reasons for the positions they advance, achieve an understanding of their mutual 
entanglement in the socio-structural production of injustice. The only procedural 
condition for the functioning of public deliberations in this way is the condition of 
socio-cultural diversity of participants (i.e., the condition of epistemic pluralism). Let 






































































Viewed as social practice, (rather than as ideal conditions for testing the 
legitimacy of claims in a counter-factual manner), unconstrained public discussions in 
which participants advance claims about the just arrangements of their collective life 
are deeply imbued by the features of participants’ social identities and status36, as well 
by features of the social practices through which participants’ socialization has taken 
place within specific contexts. It is exactly because deliberations are invariably 
marked by participants’ social identities that the mutual reason-giving takes place as 
intersubjective (rather than interpersonal) dynamics of communication. To the extent 
that public deliberations involve the full range of socio-cultural diversity in society 
(ergo, the requirement of epistemic pluralism) they can be regarded as a condensed 
expression, in a dialogical form, of the larger dynamics of social interactions taking 
place in societies.  
How does this dialogical expression of larger social interactions take place? 
Deliberations, especially if they involve a diverse public, do not immediately mobilize 
a ‘common’ sense - sense shared by all.  Instead, they proceed as ‘making sense in 
common’, starting from the questioning of a social practice which, whether tacitly or 
explicitly, is the object of debates on justice. This happens through what I 
conceptualize as a process in which some aspects of common social practices become 
visible (to participants) as issues first of all relevant for normative disagreement and 
therefore -- for public debate.  What deliberations in the first place do is that, as they 
are triggered by lived experiences of social injustice, they proceed as articulation of a 
number of reference points participants deem to be relevant to their relations to others 


























































































wearing the Islamic headscarf in universities in France and Turkey, although having a 
common point of normative contestation (allowing or not the display of religion 
identity in a secular society), have brought forward different reference points as being 
normatively relevant.  In the French case, the grievance against the headscarf ban 
concerns the tacit subordination of Islamic group identity to a hegemonic secular 
identity. In the Turkish case, the grievance against the headscarf ban concerns the 
deprivation of women from more traditional rural background from access to 
university education. In the first case, the field of relevant reference points is 
constructed along the distinctions between a dominant secular French culture versus 
socially subordinated religious culture; in the second case the key distinction 
structuring the field of reference points is that between an identity related to a 
hegemonic urban modern culture versus an identity related to a subordinate traditional 
rural culture.  The differences between the sets of reference points activated in the two 
debates are due to the differences in the experiences of injustice that have initiated 
these debates.  
In other words, the formulation of conflicting positions (e.g. “the ban of the 
headscarf is beneficial/detrimental to diversity”) is both constrained and enabled by a 
basic overlapping agreement on what issues count as politically significant ones -- 
salient issues of governance around which a debate about the just rules of social 
coordination can take place.  These first articulations of visibility and relevance are 
not a matter of purely factual knowledge (e.g. “most women in liberal democracies do 
not display signs of their religious beliefs”), and neither do they have an evaluative 
function (e.g., it is better not to display religious symbols in in public), they simply 
orient judgment by way of drawing distinctions, by way of a discrimination among 




In the course of mutual argumentation, the diversity of reference points that 
individual participants introduce start to form a structured field of references, thereby 
articulating the contours of a shared notion of fairness.   Shared perceptions are thus 
formed concerning what issues are salient ones in the formation of a collective notion 
of fairness: for instance, that corporate right to free speech is related to the right of 
self-governance, or that corporate taxation has something to do with the preservation 
of lives – to return to the examples used at the begging of this analysis. It is this field 
of mutually connected reference points that serves as a framework for collective 
meaning-formation around a shared notion of fairness. This process of drawing 
distinctions and establishing linkages among reference points eventually brings about 
a conception of fairness to emerge that is shared by participants irrespectively of any 
moral disagreement they might have (for instance, regarding the prioritization among 
rights); it even enables the communicative expression of that disagreement.  Thus 
conceptualized, the societal notion of fairness does not express a pre-existing, fixed 
cultural identity of a community in the sense of a shared ethical life (Sittlichkeit); it 
expresses the relational nature of the social practices within which actors maintain 
and alter the normative order of society.   
 
5. Emancipation through Deliberation?  
The emergence, in the process of deliberative justification, of what I described above 
as a shared conception of fairness is the first step in the adjustment among conflicting 
rights within the general conception of justice. As it spells out the issues (reference 
points) in relation to which normative claims acquire particular signification (both 
meaning and significance), the conception of fairness serves as a structured space of 




deliberations is different from what is commonly prescribed by models of deliberative 
democracy. The functions of democratic discussions, in my account, is neither to spell 
out the just rules of social cooperation and political order, nor to bring about a 
consensus on a course of political action, but (1) to articulate the valid grounds of 
political decision-making and policy action; (2) to allow a disclosure of the social 
origin of lived experiences of suffering. Let me clarify this double function of critical 
deliberative judgment.   
To the extent that public deliberations are triggered by specific grievances 
concerning the authoritative normative order of society, they inevitably, though 
initially only implicitly, address the legitimacy relationship between public authority 
and citizens. This legitimacy relationship is constituted by what Claus Offe has 
described as ‘the key legitimate and legitimacy-conferring state functions’.37 These 
are functions (i.e. from defense of territorial integrity to redistributing wealth, or 
protection of collective identities) that citizens expect from public authority, 
conditioning their obedience on the effective delivery of these functions.  Before this 
relationship takes the explicit form of discrete functions of public authority, it is 
perceived by citizens in terms of reference points of practices, consequences of these 
practices, and rules codifying these practices that are seen to be politically relevant. 
Thus, suffering in individual instances of harm (say, a life lost in a hurricane) would 
not be considered as politically relevant (and thus would not enter society’s notion of 
fairness) to the extent that the sources of such suffering are seen to be personal, rather 
than social. Such instances of suffering do not give grounds for political action, as 
they are not perceived as relevant to the societal notions of fairness and therefore 


































































However, when suffering is seen to be caused by the authoritative rules of social 
cooperation (and thus by the politically sanctioned social order), then forms of 
suffering start to matter politically– i.e., they become reference points in societal 
notions of fairness. Thus, if hurricanes systematically destroy the residences of the 
poor, this indicates that the sources of harm are social, rather than natural and 
personal.  Then the loss of residence caused by a natural disaster becomes a relevant 
reference point in societal conception of fairness, redefining the grounds on which 
political decision and action can be undertaken. In this sense public deliberations have 
the important function of enunciating the valid grounds of political action in the form 
of internally structured (via mutually related reference points) notion of fairness.  
Additionally, especially when conducted in conditions of epistemic pluralism 
(representation of the full range of socio-economic and socio-cultural identities) 
public deliberations have the capacity to alter the legitimacy relationship by way of 
giving political relevance to previously unquestioned social practices. For instance, to 
return to the examples already used, deliberations might establish a link between 
corporate taxation and famine, between corporate right to free speech and the right to 
self-government, between access to sanitation and the right to life, access to internet 
and the freedom of expression– links that had previously not been drawn, but which, 
when articulated, begin giving particular signification to the debated issues of justice.  
Thus, once access to clean water starts to be problematized in relation to the right to 
life within society’s conception of fairness, the provision of clean water enters the 
legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens and calls for policy 
action.  
Judgment in this formula of unconstrained (non-ideal) public deliberations 




in the process of justification of normative claims, judgment proceeds from the 
particular experiences of structurally generated social harm, and its purpose is not so 
much the formulation of binding norms and rules, but the clarification of the social 
sources of injustice. Within this process, universality emerges not in a subsumptive, 
but in an “interactive,” way, to use Seyla Benhabib’s terms. This is universality 
enabled not by compliance with abstract moral commands, but by the all-human 
experience of suffering.  Moreover, the power of such judgment to compel political 
action is all the more stronger when public deliberations reveal the socio-structural 
origins of suffering: as inaction cannot be justified in the face of socially generated, 
and therefore avoidable, suffering. It is in this sense that unconstrained public 
discussions can be a venue of critical judgment with emancipatory outcomes.  To 
enable public deliberations to play such an emancipatory role, we do not need 
substantive or procedural tools giving access to the moral point of view. Instead, the 
single condition is full representation of the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
dimensions relevant to those grievances that are object of debates on justice. Such 
representation would enable the disclosure of the social origin of lived experiences of 
suffering.  It would do so by allowing participants to come to an understanding of the 
relational nature of specific grievances, as well as of their own complicity in the 
social production of harm by way of their participation in the mundane social 


















































































With typical wit, Stanisław Lec -- the Polish-Jewish aristocrat, socialist and 
incurable maverick, remarked that executioners always wear a mask – that of justice.  
Rather than relying on the appeal to universal justice that human rights so strongly 
emanate, I have advanced here a model of critical political judgment that checks the 
validity of claims to justice and related to them political action against an alternative 
measure: that of emancipation from structurally generated suffering.  I argued that the 
best setting for such judgment is unconstrained (non-ideal) public deliberations in 
which all relevant socio-economic and socio-cultural positions are represented. Such 
diversity prompts debates to focus not so much on the best course of political action, 
but to articulate, within an emerging framework-conception of fairness, the valid 
grounds of political judgment and policy action.  Moreover, this formula of 
justification enables the disclosure of the structural, rather than agent-specific or 
community-specific sources of harm, thus pressing a more urgent call for political 
action. This strategy allows for universal validity without presupposing universal 
justice: when debates of justice are triggered by specific grievances, and the claims 
for redress are directed to others involved in the social practices within which 
suffering originates, the process of justification follows the logic of transcending 
individual circumstances and particular cultural contexts and reaching the socially 
relevant, rather than the universal, scope of validity. This scope of validity needs not 
be larger than the social practices within which the grievances of injustice originate; 
yet there is in principle no limit to the dynamics of generalization. It is the question 
“Who suffers?”, rather than “What is justice?” that will tell judgment how far to go. 
 
 
